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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is taken from a Decree of Divorce and Judgment 
entered on August 22, 1Q86, by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State of 
Utah. Notice of Appea] to the Utah Supreme Court on September 
16, 1986. Appellate review was subsequently assigned to this 
Court on January ?8, 1987. 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint seeking divorce from 
Defendant on August 5, 1985. The parties later stipulated to 
child custody and a partial property distributionf which 
stipulation was incorporated into a Stipulation for Temporary 
Order, and Temporary Order, dated October 2, 3 986. The matter 
was tried to the Court on the merits on June 18, 1986 and the 
Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree of Divorce on August 22, 1986. 
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STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (1985) - see Addendum. 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10 (1977) - see Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of trial, Plaintiff and Defendant had been 
married in excess of 18 years. Mr. Marchant did not want the 
divorce when it was filed and would have even reconciled the day 
of trial. (Tr., p. 21, lines 1-7). 
For the first 7 years of the marriage, the parties were 
childless and the two children, Brandon and Sara, were adopted 
when it appeared that the parties were not able to bear their 
own natural children. The children were undoubtedly the light 
and focus of the parties1 attention at the time of birth, and, 
in Mr. Marchant1s case, they continue to be. The children were 
raised in a stable family setting for a few years, but then, 
changes began to occur in the relationship of the parties, with 
the major contributing problems being created by the Plaintiff. 
Defendant will not attempt to repeat many of the facts that 
have been set forth in Plaintiff's brief. However, additional 
facts need to be stated; facts which clearly and persuasively 
support the trial court's finding that the best interests of the 
children would be served by residing with their father. It is 
these facts that tipped the scales in favor of the father 
because the court, as did Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the clinical 
psychologist, found that both parents were capable of being 
awarded custody of the minor children. 
A. Facts Relating to Custody. At trial, Plaintiff called 
only herself as a witness in support of her claim that she 
should be awarded custody. Plaintiff's direct examination 
consists of only 17 pages in the record. (Tr., p. 26-43). On 
the other hand, Defendant called not only himself, but 3 other 
witnesses who gave the court considerable insight as to which 
parent should have custody of the children. 
1. Don Marchant. Mr. Marchant was, of course, 
concerned about the relationship Mrs. Marchant was maintaining 
with her boss, Doug Fonnesbeck. While Plaintiff tried to 
convince the court that it was a casual relationship, Mr. 
Marchant did not see it that way and apparently, neither did the 
trial court. Mr. Marchant testified that he became concerned 
when Plaintiff started telling him that Mr. Fonnesbeck was a 
wonderful man, that he was understanding and that she very much 
appreciated him. Mr. Marchant was also told that Mr. Fonnesbeck 
had a "dumpy wife", that he wasn't understood at home, and soon 
Mr. Marchant started hearing things around town to the effect 
that something was going on between his wife and someone at 
work. (Tr., p.72, line 16-23). When Mr. Marchant asked his 
wife about that involvement, Mrs. Marchant told him that she had 
a strong attraction for Doug Fonnesbeck. When asked if it was a 
sexual attraction, she admitted that it was. (Tr., p.73, lines 
1-3) . 
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Even though Mr. Marchant only had visitation with the 
children on the weekend for almost a year (after Mrs. Marchant 
moved and went to Salt Lake City) , Mr. Marchant testified 
concerning the activities he had with the children as follows: 
"We've been fishing, we've been hunting, we've been to 
Disneyland, we've been bowling, we've been swimming, 
we've been to the Shakespearean Festival in Cedar 
City, we've been to church, we've been on boy scout 
trips, we have done a lot of things, horseback riding, 
we've worked and we have done farm work, we've been to 
the rodeos." (Tr., p. 88, lines 8-13). 
Mr. Marchant also testified that his forest service job 
allowed him to have a flexible work schedule, he had the option 
to work anytime between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., 
that he could work 4 days a week and have 3 days off, that 
because of a supervisory position, he could organize his own 
time to suit his particular needs. In addition, Mr. Marchant 
was entitled to 36 days of annual paid vacation. (Tr., p. 89, 
lines 7-12). 
Plaintiff's sister Helen lived with her in Salt Lake City. 
Mr. Marchant objected to Helen being a mother to his children. 
Mr. Marchant felt that she was a bad inflxience on the children 
because her moral values did not coincide with what he thought 
was proper. (Tr., p. 89, lines 19-25; p. 90, lines 1-5). 
Testimony was given by Mr. Marchant that he would hire a 
housekeeper or someone to be at the home at all times when he 
was not there and that he would do so, because of his concern 
that the children should not be left home alone, as he had 
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determined to be the case after the children moved to Salt Lake 
and resided with their mother. (Tr., p. 91, lines 8-10; lines 
23-24; p. 92, lines 1-22). 
Mr. Marchant also acknowledged that he had struck his wife 
on one occasion, and the court made specific inquiry as to that 
event. After the court made inquiry, Plaintiff1s counsel (then 
David L. Mower) further inquired of Mr. Marchant as follows: 
Q Karen was talking to me while you were 
giving your answer. The argument that led up to the 
striking was over the summer arrangement for the 
children, wasn't it? 
A In truth, there were a whole bunch of 
things. It was one of those kinds of arguments that 
there probably should be a statute of limitations on 
how far back you can go. Fonnesbeck's relationship, 
our problems, the children, it was all there — and I 
slapped her. (Tr., p. Ill, lines 1-B). 
2. Dale Hale Woolsey. Mr. Woolsey testified that he 
had known Don Marchant for approximately 10 years and that 
the two had served in a bishopric in the LDS Church. He 
testified that Mr. Marchant spent quite a bit of time with 
the children and even before the parties separated, Mr. 
Marchant would take the children fishing and hunting and 
that after the separation, he would spend 24 hours a day 
with the children when he could. (Tr., p. 112, lines 
18-25; p. 113, lines 4-7). 
3. Kay M. Bowden. Mrs. Bowden had been a friend and 
neighbor of Plaintiff and Defendant for 11 years and was 
employed as a teacher's aide at the elementary school where 
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the children attended prior to their move to Salt Lake 
City. At one time, she considered Karen Marchant to be her 
best friend and thought they had a lot in common up until 
about 1982. (Tr., p. 114, lines 20-25; p. 115, lines 
13-19). Mrs. Bowden further indicated that Mr. Marchant 
was the one who brought the children to school and to 
church — that he was always there, which didn't often 
happen in all father/children relationships. 
Mrs. Bowden testified that on one occasion, she 
decided to try to talk to Karen. Of this experience, Mrs. 
Bowden testified as follows: 
"This is my chance. I haven ft talked to 
Karen for a long time. Karen had, even her 
appearance changed. Her dress had changed. 
Everything was for Karen, it seemed like. 
We no longer were in her field. And I con-
fronted her. 'Karen, are you sure these 
trips are that important?' And she let me 
know and she let me know in no uncertain 
terms that she would not work for the 
peanuts that I worked for. She was going to 
the top and she said, 'When I leave my home, 
I leave homemade cookies and homemade 
bread.' And I said, 'Karen, that's not a 
marriage, that's not a family,' and that's 
the last she ever talked to me." (Tr. , p. 
116, lines 8-18). 
When asked about what she observed between inter-
action of her own child and Sara, after Sara moved to Salt 
Lake City with her mother, Mrs. Bowden testified that Sara 
appeared to be more hyperactive than she could remember, 
having previously observed Sarah at the Bowdens' home, in 
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the neighborhood generally, and in school during the 1984-85 
school year. (Tr., p. 116, lines 19-25; p. 117, line 1) . 
She testified that she maintained the records for the school 
and that at the beginning of the year Sara was a top math 
student, but by April of that year she was at the bottom. 
She further stated that Mrs. Marchant was notified and 
advised that Sara would need remedial help the following 
year, and that it was up to Mrs. Marchant to let the school 
(in Salt Lake) know. (Tr. , p. 117, lines 1-10). Of 
significance is the fact that on cross-examination, Mrs. 
Marchant admitted that in the year she had the children in 
Salt Lake, Sara was below average in several areas and not 
above average in any area. (Tr., p. 59, lines 15-20). 
4. Dave Brown. Mr. Brown also testified that he had 
known both Plaintiff and Defendant for approximately 10 
years and that he had children close to the ages of Brandon 
and Sara. He testified that Mr. Marchant was a good example 
as a father and admired him for the time he spent with his 
children. He also testified that he observed a change in 
Mrs. Marchant during the 3 years prior to the time she left 
the family home and moved to Salt Lake City. 
A Well, it has been mentioned before, 
Karen was always active, a loving person. My 
wife and her were good friends. I thought a 
lot of Karen. And then the past few years 
she just slowly changed, especially when she 
started to work at her new job. And I don't 
remember — Zions Bank was when I really 
noticed, we noticed her changing a lot. 
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Q What ways did she change? 
A It seemed that I felt like she 
forgot her goals that was important to her in 
her religious beliefs, in her marriage, and 
in her relationship with her children. I 
also observed the kids coming home from 
school and being alone, and that was 
something that upset me that Karen didn't 
care enough not to work when her kids were 
home. (Tr., p. 124, lines 7-20). 
When asked on cross-examination if he thought that 
Karen was a good mother, he indicated that he did not. 
(Tr., p. 125, lines 9-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court acted within the bounds of its 
discretion in making the determinations of custody and property 
distribution. The trial court's findings concerning child 
custody were specifically related to the best interests of the 
children, their living conditions, and the respective parental 
qualifications and attitudes. Likewise, the trial court's 
approach to property division and alimony was equitable and 
within the recognized bounds of discretion. 
2. The trial court fully and appropriately considered the 
best interests of the children and other pertinent criteria in 
awarding custody to the defendant. The specific findings 
regarding child custody are based on and articulate factors 
relevant to the best interests of the children as well as the 
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past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parties. 
These criteria are statutorily prescribed in U.C.A. § 30-3-10 
(1977) and are among those set forth in case precedent and expert 
commentary. Being faced with a choice between "good and better," 
the trial court specifically based its decision on the respective 
home environments, Plaintiff's evolving moral attitudes as a 
factor in the marital breakup, and Plaintiff's apparent 
selfishness at the family's expense. All of these and other 
determinative criteria were based in applicable law and well 
within the trial court's bounds of discretion. 
3. An award of alimony was unnecessary and would have been 
inappropriate under the circumstances. Both parties were 
employed; each having good job security and each having an income 
sufficient to meet their respective needs. Both parties 
admittedly had been living beyond their means, and therefore, 
neither could expect to continue with their "accustomed 
lifestyle." Neither party represented any great potential for 
becoming a public charge. No alimony was warranted and the trial 
court, as a matter of discretion and obvious choice, made no such 
award. 
4, The property distribution was fair and equitable in all 
respects, and the trial court exercised appropriate discretion in 
making its awards. Plaintiff received exactly one-half of all 
marital assets except for defendant's pension fund. The 
Plaintiff will be "cashed out" of a diversity of family property 
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including real property whose values have been economically 
eroded since the decree was entered. By at least one stated rule 
of thumb, Plaintiff might have received only one-third of the 
marital property as a matter of acceptable trial court 
discretion. Defendant would have had to quit his job to have 
access to the accumulated pension amount sought by Plaintiff 
which would have worked an unfair hardship on Defendant. The 
trial court's award was just, equitable and devoid of prejudicial 
discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF ITS 
DISCRETION IN MAKING THE DETERMINATIONS OF CUSTODY AND 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
The factors upon which the trial court relied in rendering 
its decision are clearly stated and properly applied to the 
resolution of the issues before it. The court's observations 
with respect to the best interests of the children and other 
pertinent custody considerations are rational and straight-
forward. Likewise, the property values and the basis for the 
respective awards are specifically spelled out. 
On review of such issues, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable 
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and 
property interests. A party appealing therefrom has 
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the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings; or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). See also 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974) and Baker v. 
Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976). 
Trial court discretion is particularly broadened and 
emphasized in child custody decisions. In Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen, 599 P. 2d 510 (Utah 1979) the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized their position with respect to alteration of custody 
decisions stating: 
[T]he trial court is given particularly broad 
discretion in the area of child custody incident to 
separation or divorce proceedings. A determination of 
the "best interests of the [children]n frequently 
turns on numerous factors which the trial court is 
best suited to assess, given its proximity to the 
parties and the circumstances. Only where trial court 
action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an 
abuse of discretion should the appellate forum 
interpose its own judgment. 
Id. at 511-12, quoted in, Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d 1124, 1125 
(1985) . 
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court in the 
present case has articulated specific findings relative to the 
best interests of the children, their living conditions, the 
relative parental qualifications, and parental disposition with 
respect to the care and nurturing of the minor children. 
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All of the findings made by the trial court in this matter 
are completely within its discretion. There was no 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law which resulted in 
substantial and prejudicial error, there is no evidence which 
clearly preponderates against any finding, nor is there any 
serious inequity resulting which might otherwise manifest an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion. With respect to the 
custody of the children, there is nothing in evidence or on 
record to persuasively show that the custody determination made 
by the trial court is "flagrantly unjust" or contrary to the 
best interests and welfare of the children and the family. 
POINT TWO 
THF TRIAL COURT FULLY AND APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN AND OTHER PERTINENT 
CRITERIA IN AWAPDING CUSTODY TO THE DEFENDANT 
It is genere^lly understood that in a divorce action, the 
court has and retains jurisdiction over matters of child custody 
as directed by Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(3) (1985). In 
making the initial determination of which of the divorcing 
parents should have custody, the court gets its direction from 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-10 0^77) which states: 
[W]henever a marriage is declared void or dissolved 
the court shall make such order for the future care 
and custody of the minor children as it may deem just 
and proper. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the pcist 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
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From this statutory instruction, recent opinions have 
focused on categorical consideration of some of the factors 
which may be determinative of the best interests of the child. 
See Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982);Pusey v. 
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). In both of these opinions, the 
court cites factors which might be considered in developing an 
overall view of the best interests of the child, as indicated by 
the above-cited statute. 
Plaintiff cites Hutchinson and Pusey in her brief to 
support her position that the court is somehow bound solely to 
these criteria. However, the language of the various cases is 
most illustrative with respect both to the various factors, and 
the court's discretion in applyirg or dealing with them. For 
example, in Hutchison, the court emphasizes the broad discretion 
vested in the trial court both as a preamble to the factors 
rioted in the opinion, and in the court's concluding remarks on 
the point, statincr: 
Some factors the court may consider in determining the 
child's best interests relate primarily to the child's 
feelings or special needs; the preference of the 
child; keeping siblings together; the relative 
strencrth of the child's bond with one or both of the 
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate cases, the 
general interest in continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well 
adjusted. Other factors relate primarily to the 
prospective custodian's character or status or their 
capacity or willingness to function as parents; moral 
character and emotional stability, duration and depth 
of desire for custody, ability to provide personal 
rather than surrogate care, significant impairment of 
ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
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excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons for having 
relinquished custody in the past; religious 
compatibility with the child; kinshipf includinq in 
extraordinary circumstances, step-parent status; and 
financial condition. (These factors are not 
necessarily listed in order of importance.) 
Assessments of the applicability and relative weight 
of the various factors in a particular case lie within 
the discretion of the trial court. "Only where trial 
court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion should the appellate forum 
Ln interpose its own judgment, 
original. Emphasis added.) 
(Parenthetical 
Id., citing Jorgensen, supra, at 512. 
Certainly the court did not intend by this helpful 
instruction to generate a finite list of factors to be 
considered. The court in effect added to the list in Pusey: 
We believe that the choice in competing child custody 
claims should instead be based on function-related 
tactors. Prominent among these, though not exclusive, 
is the identity of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage. Other factors should include the identity 
of the parent with greater flexibility to provide 
personal care for the child and the identity of the 
parent with whom the child has spent most of his or 
her time pending custody determination if that period 
has been lengthy. Another important factor should be 
the stability of the environment provided by each 
parent. (Fmphasis added.) 
Id. at 120, citing Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody 
in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 Fam. L. Q. 1 (Spring 
1 984^ . 
It is interesting and pertinent to note that the general 
emphasis of the Fusey case was to disavow any gender-based 
preference for determining the custodial parent. It is also 
interesting in that case that the court makes reference to the 
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earlier hypothetical scenario where "all other things being 
equal," there was a presumed preference to place children with 
the mother. Such a preference or presumption was specifically 
overruled in Pusey. However, in the case at bar, based on the 
testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the clinical psychologist, 
the court specifically found that both parties are good parents, 
and both parties could be awarded custody of the minor children. 
(Tr. at page 7.) This sets up the situation alluded to in Pusey 
where from the start all things appeared to be equal. The trial 
court subsequently considered other criteria to "break the tie." 
The court found itself in a situation quite similar to that 
of the trial court in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) . 
There it appeared that both the father and the mother were fit 
and proper and it was recognized that the court's decision 
required a finding of what was " ' reasoncible and necessary1 for 
the 'best interest' of the child — a standard which may 
frequently and of necessity require a choice between good and 
better." Id. at 55. 
In the present case, in deciding between good and better, 
the trial court articulated various specific findings which 
governed its ultimate decision on custody. Some of the stated 
findings are among those cited in Hutchinson and Pusey. Those 
findings dealing specifically with custody are the following: 
1. Finding of Fact 5.A. That both the plaintiff and 
defendant are good parents, and that both parties could be 
awarded custody of the minor children. 
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As discussed above, this finding wherein the court knew 
that it was dealing with a "close call," placed the court in the 
difficult position choosing between good and better. 
In Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1985), the lower court 
was similarly faced with a determination between good and 
better. In affirming the lower court's award of custody to the 
mother, this court stated: 
In the instant case, the evidence, depending upon how 
it is viewed, could support a custody award to either 
party. In such case, we will defer to the judgment of 
the trial court. It was therefore not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to award custody to 
defendant. 
Id. at 1125 
2. Finding of Fact 5.B. That the marriage entered into 
between Plaintiff and Defendant was broken by the actions on the 
part of Plaintiff which were not justified. 
This finding supports the court's apparent conclusion that 
Mrs. Marchant's unjustified acts of selfishness and rebellion 
and her unstable and changing moral values were inconsistent 
with a parental role. Without listing any specific actions, 
this finding is indicative of the court's consideration of the 
"past conduct and demonstrated moral character of each of the 
parties," particularly when viewed in light of the testimony of 
Dale Woolsey, Kay Bowden and Dave Brown. Since this standard is 
clearly articulated in the custody statute, it would certainly 
be within the court's discretion to apply such a finding to its 
overall custody decision. 
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3. Finding of Fact 5.C. That when the plaintiff vacated 
the family home in Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, in September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and in 
approximately November or December of 1985, her sister, another 
woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together with her 
minor child. That the standard of living under which plaintiff 
has been residing while having the temporary custody of the 
children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what it should have 
been nor was it in the best interests of the children. 
There is no question that this finding is specifically 
related to the best interests of the children. The finding 
recognizes that the children were living in a situation where 
two families were found under the same roof. Testimony 
indicated that Plaintiff's sister, Helen, did much of the caring 
for and "mothering" of the children. There is direct testimony 
that this "mother figure" had no qualms about bringing alcohol 
into the home which necessitated specific moral instruction to 
the children with respect to it. 
By comparison, the father's home presented no such moral 
obstacles, and in fact it represented the childrens1 closest 
association with the typical and traditional home life. As a 
matter of the childrens best interests, the trial court 
disapproved of the communal lifestyle presented by the Salt Lake 
City arrangement in favor of the traditional lifestyle in the 
father's home and surroundings where the children had both been 
raised since birth. 
4. Finding of Fact 5.D. That during the latter part of 
the marriage between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff became 
involved with another man and this had an influence with the 
court in determining what is the best interests of the minor 
children. 
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Again, this addresses Plaintiff's past conduct and 
demonstrated moral character which is a statutory criteria for 
determining child custody. Although different conclusions may 
be drawn from this finding with respect to the seriousness of 
the involvement, the court need not be more specific or explicit 
in its language. There was some conflict in the evidence where 
Plaintiff stated that she had never been sexually involved 
outside the marriage; but, she admitted to spending some time 
alone in a motel room with a man she admittedly loved to whom 
she had sexual attractions, and who had repeatedly given her 
gifts and flowers. (Tr., p. 72-76). The trial court obviously 
found it morally inappropriate for Mrs. Marchant to tolerate and 
rejoice in these gifts from her boss. These and other subtle 
indications that a new relationship was in bloom allow the 
direct conclusion that such overtures aided the cooling process 
in the marital relationship. For Mrs. Marchant to flaunt these 
gifts from a man to whom she was not married, while not immoral 
per se, had an obvious undermining effect on the marriage and, 
at a minimum, presented to the children an unhealthy example of 
matrimonial conduct. Plaintiff argues that such instances of 
gifts and routine associations with her boss do not go beyond 
the normal "friendship relationship with a man." The trial 
court obviously took a different view. Furthermore, to argue 
that such behavior and such a relationship could have been in 
any way "in the best interests of the children," is ludicrous. 
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5. Finding of Fact 5.E. That during the latter years of 
the marriage, Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that change was 
not in the best interests of the family unit, but rather the 
change was pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and for her benefit 
to the exclusion of the family unit. 
Plaintiff's pursuit of personal, selfish interests at the 
expense of the family unit is a resounding negative with respect 
to the overall best interests of the children. This notion is 
i 
consistent with the opinion of the psychologist, Elizabeth B. 
Stewart, Ph.D., who, in her evaluation of Mrs. Marchant, under 
the heading "Capacity for Custody," states: 
"Mrs. Marchant's desire for a better life for herself 
very probably will be a disadvantage for the children 
who may be exposed to a less desirable lifestyle." 
(The entire context of Dr. Stewart's evaluation is attached in 
the Addendum as Exhibit 5.) i 
In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra, the court was dealing 
with a custodial contest between a parent and a non-parent. The 
court recognized a presumption in favor of the parent and 
articulated factors which would overrule the presumption. In 
that context, all three of the factors which give rise to the 
presumption must be absent: 
That no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent has 
not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her 
own interest and welfare for the child, and that the 
parent lacks the sympathy for an understanding of the 
child that is characteristic of parents generally. 
Id. at 41. 
Although the present case presents a contest between both 
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parents, the fact that Plaintiff was given to her own desires 
and benefits to the exclusion of the family unit was one of the 
foremost factors warranting that custody be given to Mr. 
Marchant. Thenf the trial court's observations are consistent 
with the Hutchinson court as to the practical effect upon the 
children and the childrens1 best interests. 
The cumulative effect of the Court's findings with respect 
to child custody gives precise and ample indication of those 
factors to which the Court looked in making its determination 
between good and better. Considerations of those factors of 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards in addition to the 
best interest of the children, as weighed by the trial court, 
were sufficient to warrant the custody award to Defendant. 
POINT THREE 
AN AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS UNNECESSARY AND WOULD HAVE 
BEEN INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court expressed the purpose of alimony as follows: 
fT]he most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, 
and to prevent the wjfe from becoming a public charge. 
English v. English, 565 P.2d at 411, citing Nais v. Nais, 107 
Ariz. 411, 489 P.?d 48, 50 (1971). 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d ]072 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
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Supreme Court quoted with approval this language in English, and 
enumerated the three factors which must be considered in fixing 
a reasonable alimony award: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the 
wife; 
2. The ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; 
3 . The ability of the husband to provide 
support. 
Id., at 1075. 
In the present case, Finding of Fact 10 specifically 
provides that as of June 18th, 1986, "Plaintiff receives as net 
income the sum of $1,321.00 per month, and Defendant receive net 
income in the sum of $2,114.00 per month." The difference in 
earnings is $793.00 per month in favor of the Defendant. 
Recognizing that the Defendant had been awarded the care, 
custody and control of two minor children, together with the 
incumbent expenses of day-care and other aspects of child 
support, the numbers do not then become as disparate as they may 
initially appear. The Defendant was also charged with the 
responsibility to maintain health and accident insurance on the 
minor children and for any costs not covered. Defendant was 
also charged with the responsibility to pay past medical and 
dental bills pursuant to the Temporary Order of the Court dated 
October 2, 1985. (Finding of Fact 12.) The Defendant remains 
saddled with the lion's share of the marital debts totalling 
$32,800. (Finding of Fact 13.) 
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In terms of property division, Defendant was responsible 
for payment of $40,250 to Plaintiff for equity from the sale of 
the farm, which may or may not take place for the values 
contemplated at the time. Plaintiff's only indication of 
"need", was her expressed desire to return to school. This 
would cost her $135.00 per semester hour and she testified that 
she estimated her needs for alimony at $200.00 per month. (Tr., 
p. 43) . At the time of trial, Plaintiff earned net income of 
$1,321.00 per month which allowed her to live in an area she 
selected and in a residence that she thought was totally 
satisfactory for herself and the two children. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff had lived in Salt Lake City during the separation 
period without a temporary alimony award and did not seek one 
during that period of time. 
With respect to the factors enumerated in Jones v. Jones, 
supra, it is evident that the trial court found in the Plaintiff 
an ability to produce sufficient income for herself, that her 
financial needs and conditions were not beyond her productive 
ability, and that Defendant's ability to provide support was not 
so substantial as to justify an award of alimony. It is also 
evident from the testimony, that both parties were living beyond 
their means and that both would have to curtail their spending 
and retreat to a point where they could utilize their available 
income to satisfy their existing obligations. In this context, 
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neither party would have been able to maintain his or her 
"accustomed life style." Plaintiff had been working as a 
secretary for Intermountain Health Care for some time with no 
indication that her job was in jeopardy or that her income would 
be any way affected by the divorce. It would be difficult to 
conclude from such facts that the Plaintiff represented a 
potential for becoming a public chakge. 
In Dorrity v. Dorrity, 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) , the Utah 
Supreme Court articulated the established standard of review in 
alimony disputes as follows: 
It is well settled that this court will not disturb 
the trial court's distribution of property and award 
of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown. 
Dorrity v. Dorrity, 645 P.2d at 59. 
Both parties' standard of living had been affected in the 
negative. Both parties were then living beyond their means. 
Both parties are firmly established in their employment and each 
has continuing employment possibilities. Neither party presents 
any great potential for becoming a public charge. Therefore, no 
alimony was warranted by the circumstances. The finding that 
Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony (Finding of Fact No. 5) , 
was entirely within the Court's discretion and under no 
circumstances was that discretion exercised to the extent of 
undue prejudice. 
?2 
POINT FOUR 
THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE IN ALL 
RESPECTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE 
DISCPETION IN MAKING ITS AWARDS 
In the recent case of Claus v. Claus, 727 P.2d 184 (1986), 
the court was asked to review a disputed property distribution. 
The Court cited its earlier opinion in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 
P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), for the following proposition: 
[T]here is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of properties, it is a prerogative of the 
court to make whatever disposition of property as it 
deems fair, equitable and necessary for the protection 
and welfare of the parties. In the division of marital 
property, the trial judge has wide discretion, and his 
findings will not be disturbed unless the record 
indicates an abuse thereof. 
Id. at 185, citing Fletcher, supra, at 122. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff accurately points out that, 
except for the pension plan, the Court divided the marital 
property equally between the parties and required in the form of 
a Judgment, that the sum of $40,250 be paid to the Plaintiff over 
a five year period, in yearly installments, with interest on the 
amount at the rate of 8% per annum. (Decree of Divorce, 
paragraph 6-B.) Plaintiff curiously overlooks the fact that 
Defendant was a] so required to pay all of the marital debts in 
the approximate amount of $32,800. 
For the Plaintiff to argue that she did not get an equal 
share of the retirement fund and that therefore the property 
award is inequitable and an abuse of discretion is ludicrous. 
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Indeed, in this matter the Court might well have resorted to the 
rule of thumb followed in Cox v. Cox, 532 P. 2d 994 (Utah 1975) 
wherein the court stated: 
Because of the variableness and complexities involved 
in family troubles there is no firm rule or formula 
that can be uniformly applied in all cases in the legal 
surgery necessary to severing such relationships which 
will best serve the desired objective of allocating the 
economic resources so that the parties involved can 
reconstruct their lives in the most happy and useful 
manner. However, as an aid in that endeavor, in the 
past the courts have often resorted to a general "rule 
of thumb" of one-third to the wife and two-thirds to 
the husband? and that is what the court appears to have 
done here. Upon our survey of the circumstances of 
these parties we see no reason to believe that the 
application of that general formula was so inequitable 
or unjust that we should interfere therewith. 
Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d at 997. (emphasis added) 
Following the Cox rule, the court might well have fashioned 
a less equitable result and stil3 have been within the bounds of 
appropriate discretion. 
Mr. Marchant testified that the only way he could have 
gotten any distribution from his pension was to quit his job. 
Should this court wish to make further inquiry into the equities, 
Defendant would likely offer Plaintiff $3,000 to assume $16,400 
of the marital debt (one-half of the $32,800 total). Also, this 
court may wish to consider the fact that had Mr. Marchant been 
able to withdraw $6,000 from his retirement fund, he would have 
triggered an income tax liability for which he would have been 
solely responsible. Mrs. Marchant would have received this 
$6,000 tax-free. In order to avoid these tax consequences, Mr. 
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Marchant's only alternative would have been to borrow the money, 
incur additional interest expense, and place the remainder of his 
unencumbered assets in further legal jeopardy. 
There is no evidence that the property distribution was in 
any way a prejudicial abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
With property values in the Sevier Valley receding, in liquidated 
dollars, the practical effect has worked to the Plaintiff's 
advantage. In Graff v. Graff, 699 P.2d 765 (1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court has observed the following rule on appellate review 
of such matters: 
The rule on appellate review affords considerable 
deference to the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. The burden is on the one attacking the 
decree to show that the evidence does not support the 
findings. 
Id. at 766. 
Plaintiff's allegation of inequity simply does not compute. 
The real equities favor her and she suffers from no prejudice or 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate courts have generally emphasized that the trial 
court is vested with certain presumptions of propriety in making 
a final ruling on a given matter. This general presumption 
favoring the intimacy of the trial forum and the trial court's 
ultimate discretion regarding factual and legal issues has 
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typically been given even greater difference in domestic matters. 
The trial court is given "particularly broad discretion in 
the area of child custody." Likewise, as to financial and 
property interests, the trial court is vested with "considerable 
latitude." 
This latitude and broad discretion is not without its 
limits. These limits only exist where it can be shown, by the 
party attacking the trial court's decision, that evidence 
"clearly preponderates against the findings," that there was a 
"misunderstanding or misapplication of the law," that the trial 
court's action is "flagrantly unjust" or that the trial court's 
1 
decision works such a harsh inequity as to give "clear evidence" 
that the trial court has "abused its discretion." Plaintiff has 
not shown, nor can she show that any of these limits were 
exceeded because they simply were not. 
All of the testimony relative to child custody developed the 
issue as a "close call" — a choice between "good and better." 
The trial court made a specific finding to this effect. With 
statutory direction the trial court found that Plaintiff's past 
actions and conduct were not justified and caused the marriage to 
fail. The trial court specifically found that Plaintiff's living 
arrangements in Salt Lake City were not in the best interests of 
the children. There was articulated disapproval of Plaintiff's 
past moral conduct and a specific statement that such conduct was 
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influential in the court's overall determination regarding the 
best interests of the children. Finally, the trial court 
specifically found that the Plaintiff's lifestyle had changed and 
that the change did not work to the best interests of the 
children or the family unit. 
Cited cases have developed veritable "laundry lists" of non-
exclusive or suggested criteria. Many of the listed factors are 
implicit in the trial court's pronounced findings. For example, 
the court didn't say that Plaintiff was "unstable"; however, it 
did find that her lifestyle had changed. The trial court did not 
find that Plaintiff had demonstrated an unwillingness to function 
as a parent; but it did find that the Plaintiff's standard of 
living was not what it should have been and that Plaintiff had 
chosen to pursue her persona] desires to the exclusion of the 
family unit. There is no requirement that the court consider all 
available criteria and make a specific finding as to each. Such 
word games should not be condoned or encouraged on appellate 
review. 
The appropriate requirement is, and should be, that the 
trial court articulate the specific findings on which the custody 
determination was based. Such specific findings were articulated 
in this case. They are set forth herein, with abundant review 
and commentary. These findings give substantial and significant 
support to the custody determination made by the trial court. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the findings, as articulated, 
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do not evince any misapplication or misunderstanding of the law 
nor do they demonstrate any "flagrant injustice" or abuse of 
discretion. 
An alimony award should be preceded by a finding that the 
wife has needs which she cannot meet and that the husband has an 
ability to meet those needs. (In this context, "needs" should be 
distinguished from "wants.") Also considered is the wife's 
accustomed lifestyle and an interest In preventing her from 
becoming a public charge. 
In this case, both had grown accustomed to living beyond 
their means. Both parties had a ^table and fairly respectable 
income. Their employment potentials were bright, leaving little 
concern of public burden. In testifying concerning her "needs/1 
Plaintiff stated that she "wanted" to go back to school. With an 
anticipated cost of $135 per semester hour. There were no 
calculations of need beyond this. Plaintiff arbitrarily stated 
that she would "need" $200 per month. Otherwise, this purported 
"need" was unsupported by the evidence. Without such evidence, 
the trial court appropriately declined the request for alimony. 
There is no fixed formula to prescribe property 
distributions in domestic matters. In come cases the wife has 
received a 40-60 split, in others a 1/3-2/3 split. Such splits 
are understood to be highly discretionciry at the trial court 
level. 
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In the present case, Plaintiff has been awarded a 50-50 
split of approximately $86,000 of diverse real and personal 
property with no responsibility for any of the debt. She has 
been awarded 1/3 of an $18,000 pension fund which can only be 
liquidated on Defendant's job termination. With this award 
in-hand, Plaintiff complains of inequity and charges abuse of 
judicial discretion in the trial court's award which denies her 
an additional $3,000. Given the recognized discretion and the 
relative equities, Plaintiff's assertions are meritless. 
Plaintiff has failed to show any flagrant injustice. 
Plaintiff has likewise failed to show any materia] misapplication 
or misunderstanding of the law. There has been no showing of 
evidence which "preponderates against the findings," or 
demonstrates any abuse of the trial court's discretion. Because 
Plaintiff has failed in all respects to carry her burden, the 
trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this c>l/\<z/ day of April, 1987. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3 -^ day of April, 
1987, four (4) copies of the within and foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF were mailed to Craig M. Peterson, Esq. and Paul E. Wood, 
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, first-class postage prepaid. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. UCA § 30-3-5 (1985) 
2. UCA § 30-3-10 (1977) 
3. Decree of Divorce 
4. Findings of Fact 
5. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart's Custody Evaluation 
6. Partial Transcript of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care 
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include 
in even* decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the pay-
ment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court 
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children. 
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and 
health and dental care, or the distribution of the'property as shall be rea-
sonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and 
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child 
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order 
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automati-
cally terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that 
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony 
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party 
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined 
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse % 
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the 
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is 
further established by the person receiving alimon\ thai the relationship 
or association between them is without any sexual contact. 
30-3-10. * Custody of children. In any case of separation of husband 
and wife having minor children, or whenever a marriage is declared void 
or dissolved the court shall make such order for the future care and cus-
tody of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and the 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's 
desires regarding the future custody; however, such expressed desires shall 
not be controlling and the court may, nevertheless, determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
250 South Main 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD J. MARCHANT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9605 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court, sitting 
without a iury, on June 18th, 1986. At that time, Plaintiff 
appeared, together with her attorney, David L. Mower. Defendant 
likewise appeared, together with his attorney of record, Hans Q. 
Chamberlain. More than three months have elapsed since the 
filing of the Complaint by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff and Defendant 
were each called to testify concerning said matter, together with 
other witnesses. The matter having been submitted to the Court, 
and the Court having been fully advised in the premises, now 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Sevier 
County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the time 
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1 II the Complaint was filed in this matter. 
2 I 2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 8th, 
3 I 1967, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and ever since said time have been 
4 and now are husband and wife. 
5 3. The Court finds that Defendant has treated the Plaintiff 
6 cruelly, both mentally and physically, and that the parties 
7 simply cannot continue to maintain the marital relationship. By 
8 reason of the same, Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, 
9 final and effective upon entry, the Court, for good cause, having 
10 waived the interlocutory period required by law. 
11 4. Two children were adopted by the parties, namely, 
12 Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena 
13 Marchant, born April 22, 1977. Pursuant to a Stipulation 
14 concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court 
15 dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with 
16 Plaintiff in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been 
17 visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from 
18 his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City, 
19 Utah, picking up the children, returning to his home, and 
20 thereafter returning the children to the Plaintiff's home on 
21 Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in 
22 Central, Utah. 
23 5. In determining what is in the best interests of the 
24 children for purposes of determining custody, the Court makes the 
2b II following specific findings: 
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A. That both the Plaintiff and Defendant are good 
parents, and that both parties could be awarded custody of 
the minor children. 
B. That the marriage entered into between Plaintiff 
and Defendant was broken by the actions on the part of 
Plaintiff, which were not justified. 
C. That when the Plaintiff vacated the family home in 
Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, in 
September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and in 
approximately November or December of 1985, her sister, 
another woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together 
with her minor child. That the standard of living under 
i 
which Plaintiff has been residing while having the temporary 
custody of the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what 
it should have been nor was it in the best interests of the 
children. 
D. That during the latter part of the marriage between 
Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff became involved v/ith 
another man and this fact had an influence with the Court in 
determining what is in the best interests of the minor 
children. 
E. That during the latter years of the marriage, 
Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that change was not in the 
best interests of the family unit, but rather the change was 
pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and for her benefit to the 
exclusion of the family unit. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2b 
MBERLA1N 
HIGBEE 
NEY8 AT LAW 
SOUTH MAIN 
> BOX 7 2 6 
DAR CITY, 
KH 8 4 7 2 0 
> 586 -4404 
6. That by reason of the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor 
children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective 
July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested 
in the Plaintiff, including, but not limited to the following 
specific visitation privileges: 
A. Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided however, that for 
each Sunday while the children are in the care of the 
Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church 
and it can be a church of their choice. 
B. Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of 
July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are 
to remain in the care of the Defendant. 
C. A six-week visitation with the minor children 
during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987, 
at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties. 
7. By reason of the fact that the care of the minor 
children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award 
child support to either party. 
8. The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to 
alimony. 
9. The assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant are 
awarded as follows: 
A. The family home located in Central, Sevier County, 
Utah, is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt 
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thereon which Defendant shall be required to pay and 
discharge, and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from 
the payment of the same. Plaintiff is entitled to one-half 
of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum 
of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against 
said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter 
set forth. Said home is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53f04"E for 
2483.91 ' more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence 
South along the west line of State Highway Right 
of Way, for 104f, thence West for 192.31*; thence, 
North for 104f; thence East for 192.31 r to the 
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more 
or less. 
B. The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties 
located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum 
of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to 
one-half of said equity, or the sum of $21,750 each. The 
farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold 
on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be 
distributed as hereinafter set forth. The remaining 43.5 
acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described 
as follows: 
PARCEL 1; 
Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West 
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24 
South, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South 1.55 
chains; thence West 15.77 chains; thence North 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MBERLAIN 
HIGBEE 
NEYS AT LAW 
SOUTH MAIN 
O BOX 726 
DAR CITY, 
AH 8 4 7 2 0 
) 586 -4404 
10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence 
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains; 
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains 
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway; 
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said 
railway to the place of beginning, containing 
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South 
half 
15. 
of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section 
PARCEL 2: 
Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86 
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14, 
Township 24 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running 
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North 2.88 
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42 
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West 
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North, 
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains; 
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West 10.50 
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence 
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx. 
15.61 acres. 
Excluding therefrom: 
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04"E for 
2483.91' more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running 
thence South along the west line of State 
Highway Right of Way, for 104f, thence West 
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104f; thence 
East for 192.31' to the point of beginning 
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 3: 
Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest 
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
1.50 chains; thence North 12° 14' East along East 
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains, 
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and 
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of 
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to 
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section 
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35' 
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning. 
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less. 
C. The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby 
awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant 
shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in 
said equipment. 
D. Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of 
$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property. 
To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a 
lien against the farm property above-described in said 
amount and when the farm is sold as ordered herein, 
Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250, 
and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant. If 
the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to 
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all 
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of 
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum 
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and 
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a 
five year period, in yearly installments, together with 
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum. 
E. The proceeds that will be available for 
distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from 
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in 
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be 
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
7 
1 || F. The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that 
2 || is surplus water over and above that which is needed to 
3 irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per 
4 share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June 
5 18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided 
6 equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant. 
7 G. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the 
8 personal property now in their possession. 
9 H. The photographs and family albums now in the 
10 possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the 
11 Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to 
12 reproduce any of said photographs within thirty days 
13 thereafter. At the end of thirty days, said photographs and 
14 family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the 
15 same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff 
16 to the Defendant. 
17 10. The Court finds that as of June 18th, 1986, Plaintiff 
18 receives as net income the sum of $1,321.00 per month, and 
19 Defendant receives net income in the sum of $2,114.00 per month. 
20 11. The Court finds that Defendant has a vested interest in 
21 his retirement by reason of his U.S. Government employment in the 
22 approximate sum of $18,000, as of June 18th, 1986, and that 
23 Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title and interest 
24 in said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled 
25 to $6,000 by reason of said vested interest. Said sum shall be 
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payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period, 
together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum, payable at 
the rate of $600.00 per year, together with accrued interest, 
with the first annual payment of principal and interest to be 
paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and 
continuing thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until 
the entire principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued 
interest is paid in full. Defendant shall be entitled to prepay 
said amount at any time without penalty. 
12. Defendant shall be required to maintain health and 
accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any 
medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance, 
Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same. 
13. The debts accumulated between Plaintiff and Defendant 
after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party incurring the 
same, with the exception of the medical and dental bills which 
have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor children, which 
shall be paid by Defendant as per the Temporary Order of the 
Court dated October 2nd, 1985. In connection with said medical 
bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each required to 
first submit the same to their respective carrier for payment and 
in the event payment is not made, Defendcint shall thereafter pay 
and discharge said medical and dental expenses. 
14. The Court finds that neither party is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
the Defendant, final upon entry, upon the grounds of physical and 
mental cruelty. 
2. The care, custody and control of the minor children is 
hereby awarded to the Defendant, effective July 1st, 1986, upon 
the terms and conditions as set forth above. 
3. That the Decree of Divorce include and be consistent 
DATED this M, 
with the Findings of Fact as above set forth. 
'_ day of August, 1986. 
DON^. TIBBS 
D i str i ct .Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DAVID L. MOWER 
Attorney/for Plaintiff 
'(5/lS/SC 
NS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
ttorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
to Mr. David L. Mower, JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main, 
Richfield, Utah 84701, first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd 
day of September, 1986. 
I f i ' . f f ' ? - ,yy^r^-t 
Secretary 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
250 South Main 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
ccs s:r -3 AM 9-1 
-...cur.; Zm^u^t - VJIY 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD J. MARCHANT, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 9605 
This matter having been tried to the Court, sitting without 
a jury, on June 18th, 1986. On said date, Plaintiff having 
appeared, together with her attorney of record, David L. Mower, 
and Defendant having appeared, together with his attorney, Hans 
Q. Chamberlain, and Plaintiff and Defenant having been sworn to 
testify concerning said matter together with other witnesses, 
and the Court having been fully advised in the matter and having 
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefor; 
IT IS HFREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DCREED that said 
Plaintiff be granted a Decree of Divorce from Defendant 
providing as follows: 
1. The Decree of Divorce shall bcome final upon the filing 
of the same in the office of the Sevier County Clerk. 
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2. That two children were adopted by the parties, namely, 
Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena 
Marchant, born April 22, 1977. Pursuant to a Stipulation 
concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court 
i 
dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with 
Plaintiff in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been 
visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from 
his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, picking up the children, returning to his home, and 
thereafter returning the children to the Plaintifffs home on 
Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in 
Central, Utah. 
3. That pursuant to the Finding of Fact made herein, the 
Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor 
children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective 
July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested 
in the Plaintiff, including, but not limited to the following 
specific visitation privileges: 
A. Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided, however, that for 
each Sunday while the children are in the care of the 
Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church 
and it can be a church of their choice. 
B. Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of 
July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are 
to remain in the care of the Defendant. 
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C. A six-week visitation with the minor children 
during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987, 
at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties. 
4. That by reason of the fact that the care of the minor 
children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award 
child support to either party. 
5. That the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to 
alimony. 
6. That the assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant 
are awarded as follows: 
A. The family home located in Central, Sevier County, 
Utah, is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt 
thereon which Defendant shall be required to pay and 
discharge, and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from 
the payment of the same. Plaintiff is entitled to one-half 
of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum 
of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against 
said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter 
set forth. Said home is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53f04"E for 
2483.91' more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence 
South along the west line of State Highway Right 
of Way, for 104', thence West for 192.31f; thence, 
North for 104'; thence East for 192.31' to the 
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more 
or less. 
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B. The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties 
located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum 
of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to 
one-half of said equity, or the sum of $21,750 each. The 
farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold 
on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be 
distributed as hereinafter set forth. The remaining 43.5 
acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described 
as follows: 
PARCEL 1: 
Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West 
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24 
South, Range 3 West, of the Scilt Lake Meridian, 
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South 1.55 
chains; thence West 15.77 chains; thence North 
10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence 
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains; 
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains 
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway; 
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said 
railway to the place of beginning, containing 
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South 
half of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section 
15. 
PARCEL 2: 
Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86 
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14, 
Township 2 4 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running 
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North 2.88 
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42 
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West 
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North, 
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains; 
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West 10.50 
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence 
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx. 
15.61 acres. 
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Excluding therefrom: 
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04"E for 
2483.91 f more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S.r R3W., SLB&M and running 
thence South along the west line of State 
Highway Right of Way, for 104f, thence West 
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104f; thence 
East for 192.31' to the point of beginning 
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 3: 
Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest 
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
1.50 chains; thence North 12° ]4' East along East 
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains, 
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and 
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of 
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to 
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section 
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35f 
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning. 
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less. 
C. The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby 
awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant 
shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in 
said equipment. 
D. Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of 
$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property. 
To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a 
lien against the farm property above-described in said 
amount and when the farm is sold as ordered herein, 
Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250, 
and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant. If 
the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to 
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all 
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of 
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum 
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and 
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a 
five year period, in yearly installments, together with 
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum. 
E. The proceeds that will be available for 
distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from 
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in 
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be 
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
F. The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that 
is surplus water over and above th£it which is needed to 
irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per 
share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June 
18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided 
equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant. 
G. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the 
personal property now in their possession. 
H. The photographs and family albums now in the 
possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to 
reproduce any of said photographs within thirty days 
6 
¥6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
23 
22 
23 
24 
25 
thereafter. At the end of thirty days, said photographs and 
family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the 
same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff 
to the Defendant, 
7. That Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title 
and interest in his retirement account with the U.S. Government, 
said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled to 
$6,000 by reason of said vested interest. Said sum shall be 
payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period, 
together with interest, payable at the rate of $600.00 per year, 
together with accrued interest at the rate of 8% per annum, with 
the first annual payment of principal and interest to be paid by 
the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and continuing 
thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until the entire 
principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued interest is 
paid in full. Defendant shall be entitled to prepay said amount 
at any time without penalty. 
8. That Defendant shall be required to maintain health and 
accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any 
medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance, 
Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same. 
9. That the debts accumulated between Plaintiff and 
Defendant after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party 
incurring the same, with the exception of the medical and dental 
bills which have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor 
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children, which shall be paid by Defendant. In connection with 
said medical bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each 
required to first submit the same to their respective carrier for 
payment and in the event payment is not made, Defendant shall 
thereafter pay and discharge said medical and dental expenses. 
10. That neither party is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees. 
DATED this 22 
A,0 
r~ DON V. TIBBS District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
X' -jJ< JSkUy^'- ^U'dtit-
DAVID L . MOWER 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to Mr. David L. Mower, 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main, Richfield, Utah 84701, 
first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of September, 1986. 
•'<s-~ 
Secretary \ 
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Marchant v . Marchan t 
C i v i l Number 96051 
S e v i e r Cc. , U^aii 
Psycnoloqical Fvaluation of 
Donald Marchant 
Background 
* Mr. Marchant was raised in Kamas, Utah where he met 
MW*. Marchant. He was a graduate of BYU and has worked as a 
civil e{|9;^ neer for the Forest Service for about fifteen 
years. 
Mr. Marchant met Mrs. Marchant after he returned from 
a LPS mission. They dated for about nine months and were 
married in September of 1967. He was attracted to her 
because she was cute, intelligent, and lively. 
He felt the marriage went quite well and did not 
recognize signals that the marriage was drifting apart. He 
recognized that after she suffered a whiplash injury in a 
car accident she became depressed and was severely 
restricted in her activities. This was shortly before Sara 
was born. At about that time they bought a farm near 
Richfield, Utah which took quite a bit of Mr. Marchant's 
time. As he looks back, he recognizes that Mrs. Marchant 
felt ne<^J#cted. He recalls that she asked him to talk to 
ner and to do things with her. He did not feel that those 
things were very important until much later on. 
Mrs. Marchant suffered another injury to her neck 
about three y$„ <s #f#er the first injury. She continued to 
have periods of depression and the marriage did not seem to 
be as happy for her as it was satisfying for him. When Sara 
was about six-years-old Mrs. Marchant decided to go to work 
and Mr. Marchant did not object. However, he felt that the 
marriage deteriorated after that point because Mrs. 
Marchant seemed to be more interested in working. He was 
critical of her friends and felt that she was being 
flirtatious with male workers. He was particularly annoyed 
that she was so flattered by the attention of other men. He 
was also self-conscious because he had a prominent position 
in the Church and was concerned about how other people in 
the community might view them. While she denied having any 
interest in other men, Mr. Marchant really could not shake 
that conviction. When Mrs. Marchant made some business 
trips to Salt Lake she apparently met her boss on at least 
one occasion, which only added to Mr. Marchant's 
suspiciousness and jealousy. They went to counseling in 
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late 1984. It appears that each of them had suggested 
counselinq to the other and each had felt unimpressed with 
the other's suaqestion. By the time they went to counseling 
in late 1984 Mrs. Marchant did not like tc be touched 
pnysically and was beginning to show a qreat deal of 
hostility toward his physical advances. He recognized that 
the marriage was permanently doomed when he lost control 
and hit her. He moved out of the home on March of 1985 when 
she made it clear that she needed some breathing space. He 
had a hard time understanding that their separation was 
goin^ to be permanent, and he still has a great deal of 
difficulty letting go of her. Apparently Mrs. Marchant has 
never made it really clear to him what her complaints were. 
This may have undoubtedly contributed to his anger toward 
her . 
Personal Qualities 
Mr. Marchant is a very bright, well-informed person 
whose reasoning is thoughtful and incisive. He is an 
intense, high energy person who is efficient and productive 
and who expects others to be the same. He has good self-
control most of the time. His personality is basically a 
passive-aggressive one in which hostility i^'not frequently 
expressed directly; it is modified and channeled by his 
education,•social expectations, and self-control so that it 
appears in the form of competition, dominance, and in more 
oblique forms such as uncboperativeness, insistence, 
argumentativeness, and an inclination to retaliate when 
slighted, His rather proper social manner and well-defined 
sense of personal identity, as well as his self-control, 
contribute to efficiency and stable lifestyle. 
Mr. Marchant is socially somewhat extroverted in the 
sense of being poised and confident. He is also optimistic 
and rather trusting in that he assumes his ideals and 
expectations will be honored by others. He is not 
gregarious nor dependent upon social interactions for 
personal satisfaction but he does get along well with 
people in well defined situations. He has definite ideas 
about right and wrong, stands up for what he believes, and 
is not much influenced by what other people think. He may 
discount other people's opinions or needs and may not 
negotiate well with others who differ with him on issues. 
Donald Marchant 
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Mr. Marchant has a strong need for affection which is 
not easily met because he is such an independent and 
somewhat demanding person. 
Relationship with Brandon and Sara 
Mr. Marchant has a very close parent-child bond with 
both children. The relationship is a close and trusting 
one. fie is genuinely concerned about their welfare and has 
a great affection for the children. He is aware of their 
individual differences and their needs for individual 
attention. He has strong moral standards and is attentive 
to their intellectual and social development. 
Mr. Marchant i? very concerned that the children have 
someone with them after school during the school year as 
well as during the summer months. He recognizes that both 
he and.'Mrs. Marchant will have to work but he feels that he 
is better able to provide for suitable care than is Mrs. 
Marchant. His interest in doing welj. and being responsible 
in a small community is a distinct asset. While he has 
passive-aggressive personality and some tendencies to be 
hostile, this side of his personality is not frequently 
shown to the children and probably would not create much of 
a problem. He seems to recognize that his teasing did not 
go over very well with Mrs. Marchant and that it may have a 
negative effect on the children if he were to treat them in 
the same manner. 
Mr. Marchant feels that the,children would be better 
of with him because of what he perceives as Mrs. Marchant's 
drift from family responsibilities into a more active 
personal and social life where moral values may be 
sacrificed. He is also convinced that the children will 
have a healthier lifestyle in a small town where they are 
well-known and where there are healthy activities in 
addition to adequate schools. 
Mr. Marchant's motivation for custody is sincere and 
is based upon good values. His present interest is with the 
welfare of the children; he is not using the custody 
dispute as any type of retaliatory gesture toward Mrs. 
Marchant. 
Donald Marchant 
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Attitude Toward Mrs. Marchant 
Mr. Marchant has an uneasy relationship with Mrs. 
Marchant. He recognizes that the marriage is not 
salvageable although he very much wishes that were not so. 
In spite of feeling that her personal and social activities 
wa.ll be detrimental to the children by decreasing her time 
with them, he is not inclined to sabotage the mother-child 
relationship. His interest in the welfare o£ the children 
is too strono to engage in any kind of retaliation. He 
recognizes the children's affection for their mother, her 
love for them, and the fact tnat she has been a good mother 
pven thougn he is critical of the amount of time that she 
cnose to be away from the children at a time in their life 
where this was a discretionary matter. If Mrs. Marchant 
were awared custody, he would cooperate in honoring 
visitation arrangements. 
Capacity for Custody 
Mr. Marchant is a very responsible adult who is very 
much aware of the need for stability, guidance, nurturing 
in the home. Mr. Marchant's desire for custody is certainly 
genuine and realistic, and he would be an adequate 
custodial parent. 
Procedures Used 
MMPI 
16 PF Test 
Rotter Sentence Completion 
Subtests from the WAIS-R 
Custody Questionnaire 
Individual interview 
Joint interview with Mrs. Marchant 
Observations with the children 
Elizafbeth B. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology 
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Psychological Evaluation of 
Karen Marchant 
Background 
Mrs. Marchant is a thirty-seven-year-old woman born in 
Elko, Nevada, and raised in Clover Valley (close to Wells, 
Nevada), and later in Peoa, Utah. Her father died when she 
was twelve years old in an accident on the farm. When she 
was sixteen years old her mother moved the family of five 
girls and three boys to Peoa where she bought a beef and 
daiTy operation. 
/4rs. Marchant was very close to her family and 
especially to her twin sister, Kathy. Because she was a 
twin and also because the family lived in very small towns 
there was a lot of reliance on each other. 
Mrs. Marchant attended the Brigham Young University 
for two years prior to her marriage to Mr. Marchant when 
she was eighteen years old. The marriage was fine at first 
but she felt that it began to deteriorate after about five 
years because of what she perceived to be Mr. Marchant's 
demands, particularly in sexual matters. She felt that he 
was a controlling person who needed her to conform. She was 
accustomed to pleasing other people and enjoyed pleasing 
him until she felt that the relationship was one-sided 
because he expected too much from her. 
The marriage relationship was also strained following 
a whiplash injury which resulted in a great deal of pain 
and depression. This injury was followed by another 
whiplash injury about three years later. Pain, depression, 
and dissatisfaction with her marital relationship 
continued. She recognized that her depression and long 
periods of sleep in the daytime were no way to live and 
that her her life was getting out of control. She decided 
that working would be an opportunity to get out of the home 
and to become more productive. At first she felt that Mr. 
Marchant approved of her working because the income helped 
them in the purchase of their farm. However, she felt that 
later he became jealous and suspicious of the men with whom 
she worked. She dismissed his suspicions of her 
relationships as being obsessive and unjustified. Her 
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experience at work gave her confidence as well as a new 
dimension to her life. There were frequent arguments, 
usually about her work and work relationships. Apparently 
he hit her on two different occasions, one of which knocked 
her down and caused oruises on her face. This was 
particularly painful because she was havinq a lot of pain 
witn the soft tissue in*)ury around her neck from the 
previous automobile accidents. 
Hitting had not been a pattern in their marriage. Mr. 
and Mrs. Marcnant both had some counseling followinq that 
occasion. The counseling was especially helpful to her in 
sorting out some thinqs and being less fearful of what 
other people would say if it were generally known that she 
and Mr. Marchant were navmg marriage problems. There had 
been no history of divorce in the families and sne felt 
quite uneasy about disappointing other people and their 
expectations. 
The Marchant's were in therapy about October of 1984. 
They separated during March of 1985. Mrs. Marchant remained 
in the family home with the children. When the position she 
held in Richfield was terminated in the Summer of 1985 she 
moved to Salt Lake City where she was able to continue her 
employment with Intermountain Health Care. 
Personal Qualities 
Mrs. Marchant is a very bright, well-informed, 
quick-thinking person. She learns quickly, adapts well, and 
appears to be a very efficient as well as - sociable 
individual. Mrs. Marchant is an optimistic and self-
confidant person who has high standards for herself and 
others. She is outgoing and deals well with other people 
because of her poise and ability. Her interests are 
traditionally feminine and she is somewhat passive in her 
relationships. Sne has a strong need for affection; 
pleasing other people and being accepted contribute to her 
strong motivation to do well. She is an ambitious person 
with a lot of resources whose success comes from a 
cooperative rather than competitive style. She is 
relatively inpeturbable and can function under quite a bit 
of stress. She is sensitive to other people's feelings as 
Karen Marchant 
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well as to her own. Empathy and sympathy come naturally to 
her . 
It appears that Mrs. Marchant may be embarking on the 
divorce with more confidence and optimism about the future 
tfran may be justified. Her mannerisms and appearance draw 
otner people to her but she may mistake attention and 
interest for genuine affection and dependable long-term 
relationships. Her very dutiful behavior during the early 
part of her marriage resulted from her passive tendencies 
and her acceptance of church sanctioned role expectations. 
Her success in the work force subseauently demonstrated 
that sJ>ev.can fine satisfaction without being submissive. It 
appears that she is rebelling in this divorce as much as 
she is removing herself from a subtly hostile and demanding 
marital relationship.. 
Relationship with Brandon and Sara 
Mrs. Marchant has a close parent-child bond with each 
child. She had been the primary caretaker until she began 
work and since that time has maintained that role albeit 
with much less time with the children. They have become 
accustomed to sitters for after school and summer hours. 
She relates well to them and they to her. 
Attitude Toward Mr. Marchant 
Mrs. Marchant feels she could no longer live with Mr. 
Marchant because his interest in sex was so demanding that 
he did not respect her need for less intimacy. In addition, 
she would not risk any further physical assaults. She 
resents his blaming her "being so cute" as the reason for 
his attraction to and need for her. She felt valueless to 
him outside their physical relationship. The separation and 
divorce allow her to feel good about herself. 
Mrs. Marchant acknowledges Mr. Marchant's positive 
effect on the children, his love for them, and their need 
for him. She would cooperate in visitation if she had 
custody. She would be very surprised if she did not get 
Karen Marchant 
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custody and had to deal with him and arrange her own visits 
with the children. 
Capacity for Custody 
Mrs. Marchant is a sensitive person who is capable of 
providing a home and nurturance to the children but who may 
have difficulty meeting their needs, her work schedule, and 
her personal agenda for a more rewarding personal social 
life. At present her shared home costs and responsibilities 
reduce the burden so that life is a lost easier than it 
will be when, and if, Helen moves out. The children will 
not be so well cared for eventually if they have to Shift 
for themselves after school and in the summer in a 
neighborhood that is not as close and caring as the one 
they know m Monroe and Central, Utah. Mrs. Marchant's 
desife for a better life for herself very probably will be 
a disadvantage for the children who may be exposed to a 
less desirable lifestyle. 
Procedures Used 
MMPI 
16 PF Test 
Rotter Sentence Completion 
Individual interview 
Joint interview with Mr. Marchant 
Interviews with the children 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology 
EBS/esw 
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Sevier County, Utah 
Psychological Evaluation of 
Brandon Marchant 
Brandon is a twelve-year-old, sixth-grade student at 
the William Penn Elementary School which he has attended 
since the Fall of 1985. He reports that he likes school and 
chat he usually gets good grades, which is a sign of good 
adjustment. 
Brandon lives with his mother and sister in a four 
bedroom apartment which is shared with his mother's sister, 
Helen, and her eight-year-old son. Helen is also in the 
process of divorce. The two mothers are sharing quarters 
whilfe they get settled as single parent families. Brandon 
likes the arrangment and gets along with his cousin. 
Brandon is an alert, personable child who is outgoing 
and quite good in sizing-up situations. He seems to make 
friends easily because he is confident of himself and 
interested in other people. 
While Brandon misses his friends in Monroe and Central, 
Utah as well as the opportunity to ride horses, he also has 
enjoyed doing things in Salt Lake which were not available 
to him in the rural area. He mentioned attending the 
Pirates of Penzance, Sleeping Beauty, and three symphony 
concerts this year with his Mom and Sara. Although he 
recognizes that there are many things to do in Salt Lake he 
is careful not to show any preference for living in Salt 
Lake. He is looking forward to playing Little League 
Baseball in Central, Utah as soon as he gets out of school 
in early June. He has managed to maintain his relationships 
with neighbors in Monroe and Central during his visits with 
his father on weekends. 
Brandon has a very good relationship with both parents 
and he feels secure with both. The divorce is very hard on 
him because of split in his family. Nevertheless, he 
understands that his parents will not be living together 
and he has adjusted as well as can be expected to that 
situation. He is very careful about not expressing any 
preference for either parent and, indeed, he probably has 
none. He does not want to be responsible for deciding where 
he lives. 
Brandon Marchant 
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Procedures Used 
Joint interview with Sara and his parents 
Individual interview 
Kovac's Emotional Inventory —, 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical Psychologist 
EBS/esw 
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Psychological Evaluation of 
Sara Marchant 
Sara is nearly nine-years-old and is in third grade at 
William Penn Elementary School. She transferred from Monroe 
Elementary School which is near Central, Utah when her 
mother moved to Salt Lake early in the Fall of 1985. 
Sara is an alert, affectionate child who makes friends 
easily. She is observant, thoughtful, and adept at 
interpersonal relationships. She misses her friends in 
Monroe and Central, Utah although she has made friends 
here. At the present time she and her brother, Brandon, are 
living with their mother in an apartment which is shared 
with her Aunt Helen (who is in the process of a divorce), 
and an eight-year-old cousin. Aunt Helen is usually home 
after school, but may not continue to be available if she 
finds employment during the coming months. 
Sara ihas beeji#jwicluded in a "Lunch Bunch* at school 
which% is compose* of new transfer students. They meet 
weekly. She also hias had some exposure to a counselor for 
children of divorce wh*dh she also enjoys. These support 
groups will be helpful and should be encouraged since she 
shows some signs of depression, sadness, and loneliness. 
Sara has a good relationship with both parents and 
gets alona v^ry well with them although she sees her mother 
as being more easily aroused to anger and more inclined to 
yell than is her father. She expresses no preference for 
living with one parent or the other, and does not want to 
be responsible for such a decision. Her desire is clearly 
to live with both parents although she recognizes that this 
will not occur. Sara, like Brandon, wants the decision 
about where she will live to be made by other people. 
Sara will adapt well to either home. She may find more 
stability in her father's home, however, since her mother 
is renting and may have difficulty in maintaining the 
comfortable apartment when her sister, Helen, is 
economically able to establish her own living situation. 
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Procedures Used 
Kovac's Emotional Inventory 
Draw Family Test . 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical .Psychology 
EBS/esw 
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Marchant v. Marchant 
Civil Number 9605 
Sevier Co. . Utah 
Recommendations 
Custody 
The many factors to be considered in custody can be 
grouped into three categories: (1) Parent related factors; 
(2) Child related factors; and (3) Situational factors. The 
parent-related factors and their applicability to the 
Marchant case are as follows: 
1. Willingness to sacrifice for the welfare of the 
children. Mrs. Marchant has not been inclined to 
subordinate her need for autonomy, success, and personal 
satisfaction in favor of the children's need for her time 
and attention at a period in her life when working was a 
personal choice and not an economic necessity. Even so, the 
children apparently fared quite well because of her warm 
and nurturing relationship when she was with them, and also 
because the children had a strong sense of belonging and 
happiness in the home, school, and community. Now that the 
divorce is imminent, neither parent has the option of 
cjis^etionary employment. However, Mr. Marchant does not 
need nor value his job to provide himself or establish a 
new social life as much as Mrs. Marchant. He is established 
and stable. For this reason he may have less anxiety and 
conflict about the division of time and concern between 
home and work. He is more likely to use his after work 
hours ^ in home and family-related activities while Mrs. 
MarcharmL is still establishing her vocation and personal 
identiy. She may not have the same stable community 
recognition that would put her at ease during after work 
hours, but her personal happiness may make her obligations 
less burdensome. 
2. Emotional Stability. Mr. Marchant is stable in the 
sense of being a dominant and rigid personality as well as 
being well-established in his job. Mrs. Marchant is more 
flexible, seeks to please others, and is in the process of 
developing an identity as a single parent by choice rather 
than by necessity. The difference between the two people is 
not one of best-worst, but is a qualitative difference. The 
children have gotten along well with each parent so far and 
could adjust to either adult, not because the adults are 
the same in the personalities and emotional stability but 
because of the strong parent-child bond that exists. 
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3. Moral Character. Tnis factor is difficult to 
address in a time of changing social and personal values 
and standards. Mr. Marcnant is more staid and traditional 
in his values. His conduct has not raised the issue of 
moral character. Mrs. Marchant is more inclined to 
experiment with ner new-found freedom. Whether her choices 
will create moral conflicts in the future is uncertain but 
not improbable. 
4. Sympathy tor and understanding of the children. 
Both parents have this quality although Mrs. Marchant is 
more demonstrative. However, she has not been so empathetic 
and understanding of the children's needs as to sacrifice 
ner own need for freedom for the children's need for a 
two-parent family. 
. 5. Religious Compatibility, There are no religious 
conflicts in this family, but Mrs. Marchant seems to have 
some -reservations that would make it uncomfortable as well 
as unrewarding for her to accompany the children to church. 
Mr. Marchant has no such reservations. 
5. Financial Ability. Mr. Marchant's training and 
experience as a civil engineer commands a higher salary and 
better job opportunities than does Mrs. Marchant's training' 
and experience. She is less likely to have the same level 
of income potential or job opportunities so that her 
standard of living will not be as great unless her 
household is substantially subsidized by child support or 
she remarries someone who is not being drained by his 
child-support obligations. 
6. Sincerity and Desire for Custody. Both parents' 
desire for custody is sincere and not based upon 
retaliation or any intent to manipulate the other. 
7. Personal rather than surrogate care. Neither parent 
has any advantage in providing personal rather than 
surrogate care. At present Mrs. Marchant's sister provides 
a family connection in the afterschool care but this may 
not last long if she finds employment for herself. Mr. 
Marchant's situation in a small, close community provides 
more neighborly support by people who have known the 
Marchant children and who may be able to provide a more 
personal care than would neighbors in the Salt Lake area 
who do not know the Marchants so well. 
Recommendations 
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8. Alcohol or Drug Usage. Neither parent has any 
problems with alcohol or drug usages and there is no reason 
to think that custody would be effected by this factor. 
The child-related factors are the following: 
1
• The childrens1 feelings, special needs, preference, 
and bond with the parents. None of these factors show any 
clear preference for either Mr. or Mrs. Marchant. The 
children are basically quite well adjusted and choose to 
state no preference for either parent. Both children have 
very strong feelings of love for both parents and the 
parent-child bond is very strong. 
Situational factors: 
1. Maintaining a satisfactory custody arrangement when 
the children are happy and well-adjusted. There is a 
preference for leaving a custody arrangement in place where 
it is clear that they have made a reasonably good 
adjustment, and there is no reason to think that they are 
not doing well or that a different custody arrangement 
would be clearly better for them. In this respect, both of 
the Marchant children have adjusted well although it is 
quite clear in observing them with their father that they 
miss him a great deal. It also seems likely that Sara's 
depression and feelings of loneliness are related to her 
father's absence. However, if she were living with her 
father she may well feel as sad and lonely because of her 
mother's absence. 
2. The least disruptive placement. Since the children 
are doing well in their mother's custody at the present 
time the least disruptive placement would be to leave them 
in her custody. 
3. Primary Caretaker. Although Mrs. Marchant has 
worked full-time in recent years, she has been the primary 
caretaker. Mr. Marchant, however, has provided direct care 
also although the division of parental responsibilities has 
been quite traditional in this family. Mrs. Marchant could 
continue as she has; Mr. Marchant could adapt to being the 
primary caretaker. 
Recommendat ions 
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The custodial decision will clearly have to be made in 
view of other factors which are not covered by the custody 
evaluation. Both parents truly have the best interest of 
the children at heart and the children clearly need 
continuing relationships with both parents. 
Visitation 
Visitation was discussed with Mr. and Mrs. Marchant. 
Currently Mr. Marchant sees the children on alternate 
weekends by driving the children to and from Monroe. He has 
also tried using bus services from Salt Lake to Richfield 
and the return trip by auto. Wnile this is quite a 
financial and time burden on Mr. Marchant, he prefers to 
keep that arrangement rather than simplifying visits by 
seeing the children only on three-day weekends during those 
months that have Monday holidays, i.e., January, February, 
March-" or April (when Spring break occurs), and in May, 
September, October, and November. If Mr. Marchant had 
custody, Mrs. Marchant would arrange to go to Richfield to 
visit the children where she would visit with an aunt and 
uncle from whose home she could manage visits with the 
children. Both of the parents will probably be able to work 
out an agreeable visitation schedule after the custody 
decision is made. Each is mindful of the otherfs burden in 
traveling. 
It would be advisable to have a definite visitation 
schedule in writing even if the parents agreed informally 
to deviate from that schedule. Each parent is likely to 
begin dating and perhaps remarry within the next year or 
two during which time there will be some pressure to vary 
the visitation schedule, often at the inconvenience of the 
other parent. In order to avoid disputes about visitation a 
written schedule would enable the visiting parent to 
maintain contact and would prevent the custodial parent 
from acting as a gate keeper for his or her own 
convenience. 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that commencing on the 18th day o 
June 1964 at 2:00 p.m. the above entitled matter came o 
regularly before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge for th 
Sixth Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Sevier County 
in the Sevier County Courthouse District Courtroom, Rich 
field, Utah; 
That on the 13th of August, 1986, Hans Q. Chamber 
lain, Attorney for the Defendant in this action, requested 
copy of the PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT of the above entitled matter' 
COURT FINDINGS & RULINGS, 
That the PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT requested by th 
Defendant's Attorney is as follows herein as COURT FINDINGS 
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DAVID L. MOWER 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOKr.R 
P.O Box 605 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, UT 84701 
J^UIS Q. CHAMPERLAIM 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEF 
P.O Box 7 26 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
- H O J O O O 
5:30 P.M. 
18 JUNE 1986 
COURT FIKDIBGS & RffLIIfGS 
THE COURT: These are very difficult cases for the 
Court, in all honesty. You know I just know that you folks 
have sat here all day and when I handle criminal matters the 
whole morning, one after another where I sent four young men 
to prison, where probably a lot more are going to go, things 
you didn't see. You didn't see the presentence reports that 
I examined, and on each one of them they came from separated 
families, every one of them. 
I don't justify their conduct, but I'm just saying that's 
what it comes from. I see in those cases the same pattern, 
over and over again. They give nothing of themselves to 
anyone else, total and complete living for their own bene-
fits, broken homes, problems in school, and then it's alcohol 
and drugs, petty crime, and then all of a sudden it's 
graduated into the criminal system and I've got them. 
And then I sit and grant divorces the rest of the day on 
Law & Motion days. Think of the number of divorces I granted 
today. Most of the* are stipulations. They just come in and 
I approve the stipulations. They go out and then every once 
in awhile I get one like this where the parties are obviously 
good people, but things have gone wrong and all of a sudden 
I've got to start trying to make a decision from the mess 
that they're in. And frankly, it's traumatic to me. You 
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don't think it is, but it's ray responsibility to hear it ar 
make the best decision 1 can make and I obviously err no 
going to make people happy in that job from what I find. Bu 
that's what I do as I see it. 
As I see it, this case basically, it's for the bes 
interest of those children and I have heard the evidence an 
I have to do what I think is right at this point and regard 
less of where the problems fall. And I appreciate the wa1 
Counsel have submitted the exhibits and the evidence an 
everything else. And be that a& it may, this is my decisioi 
and I'm making it at this time. Frankly, I'm having a ver 
difficult time finding grounds for a divorce. 
I'll be honest. I have difficulty with what the Plaint-
iff sues, alleges grounds. I have difficulty finding where 
this Defendant's done anything wrong, other than slapping 
her. Maybe that was justified. I don't believe in it. 1 
don't believe anyone should use force and violence. But I'D 
having difficulty. However, under the circumstances I don't 
see where I can force them to live together. So based or 
that I'm going to find that the Defendant did treat the 
Plaintiff cruelly, causing her physical and mental anguish, 
physical anguish because he struck her on the one occasion 
when he was what appeared to me highly provoked. Based upon 
that fact, the Plaintiff is awarded the decree of divorce, 
which under the circumstances I think these parties have to 
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be divorced. 
Normally, 1*11 leave the interlocutory period in exis-
tence, but I'm going to terminate it. This decree shall 
become absolute and final upon the date of this entry, the 
interlocutory period being waived because I think they must 
be divorced and I see no advantage to anyone to have that 
continued. 
The Court awards the parcel of real property with the 
corrals and the 1 1/2 acres of land with home located thereon 
to Mr. Marchant, ^ the Defendant in this action. He shall 
assume the debt and hold the Plaintiff harmless from those 
debts and obligations. The I Court finds that she has a 
$17,000 equity in that house as of this date and I'm just 
going to hold that off for a moment. 
The Court finds that the parties have a home with 
approximately 43 acres of land that's now disposable, which 
the Court finds is valued at $2,000 an acre and has a debt on 
it of approximately $1,000 an sere, so that the Court finds 
there is a $43,500 value of that property. 
Now let me just make sure I'm not missing this. There's 
43.5 acres valued at $2,000 an acre with debt on it of 
approximately $1,000 per acre; that's right, isn't it? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: So that the Court finds there's $43,500 
equity in that property that the parties have. The Court 
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finds that the Plaintiff has consequently half interest In 
that $43,500, or she has $21,750 equity in that property. 
The Court finds that there's another $8,000 due and each of 
the parties are entitled to $4,000 of that money. 
The Court finds that they have assets in water stock. 
The Court orders that water stock sold at this time. It 
shall be sold by the Defendant within a period of one year 
and the proceeds 50 percent to each of the parties. 
The Court finds that they have $5,000 worth of farm 
equipment and the Court finds that there was some division of 
a household furniture and a mistake on it. Icm going to say 
that the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff for the 
parties interest in the farm equipment the sum of $1,500 and 
he's awarded the farm equipment. 
If my mathematics are right, I'm adding $17,000, $21,750, 
and $4,000, and if my mathematics are correct it comes out to 
$42,750; do you agree with that, gentlemen? Check it. Well, 
that's what it is. The Plaintiff is awarded the Judgement 
against the Defendant for that $42,750. 
The farm shall be sold within a period of one year and 
all of the proceeds of that farm shall be applied against the 
$42,750. The balance will go to the Defendant. If the farm 
doesn't bring the $42,750, then the Plaintiff will have a 
judgement against the Defendant for the balance, which will 
be payable with interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum 
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 over a 5-year period on an annual basis. 
2
 ||' MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I'm sorry, five years? 
THE COURT: Five years. 
The Court makes the specific finding that the Plaintiff 
5
 h has a net take home of $1,321 per month, the Defendant has a 
6
 II net of $2,114 a month. 
All of the Defendant's right to title and interest in and 
8
 jl to his retirement shall be awarded to the Defendant, subject, 
however, that he shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$6,000, which $6,000 shall be payable over a 10-year period 
at $600 per year for 10 years together with interest at 8 
percent per annum on the unpaid balance. So he can pay it 
earlier, if he wants to, but it shall be payable in that 
14
 direction. 
15
 || MR. MOWER: Excuse me, Your Honor. That means that 
he will pay $600 plus. 
THE COURT: Plus interest. And I'll make it on an 
annual basis, any particular time you want to. We'll make it 
on September 1st of each year. Well, this year we111 make it 
on June 1st, starting on June 1st, 1987. 
No Attorneys fees are awarded to either party. 
The Court specifically finds that no alimony should be 
awarded to either party in this matter. 
The Court finds that both parties are good parents, and 
both parties could be awarded custody of the minor children. 
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1 I The Court does, however, find that this marriage has been 
2 broken up by actions of the Plaintiff, and the Court finds 
3 that they are not justified. And even though these children 
* I have been in the Plaintiff's custody since this action was 
5 commenced, by prior order of the Court, the Court is of the 
6 || opinion that in the best interest of the children the custody 
j 
7 j should be awarded to the Defendant. 
8 ! The Plaintiff is awarded the right of reasonable visita-
9 tion at reasonable times and places. So that there is nc 
10 j| question on visitation rights, the Plaintiff is awarded every 
it other holiday, commencing with the 4th of July, except for 
12 j Christmas where the children shall stay in the home of the 
13 custodial parent. 
14 The Court finds that the Plaintiff shall be awarded for 
15 six weeks visitation in this summer at a six-week period, 
16 that time when she desires. 
17 I (PLAINTIFF began crying and collapsed to the floor 
18 at her Counsel*s table in the Courtroom.) 
19 THE COURT: Ro Attorneys fees are awarded to either 
20 | party. You better call in the EMT's 
21 j [WHEREUPON the Bailiff responded, along with family 
22 j members of the Plaintiff and her Counsel, Mr. Mower, to help 
23 I the Plaintiff out of the Courtroom and to give aid and 
24 | assistance to her.] 
ji 
25 [j THE COURT: Do you want me to go forward, Counsel, 
PAGE € 
4 
6 
1
 i  or do you want me to wait? 
2
 [j MR. MOWER: I think you ought to go forward, 
3 jj think it will be some time for her to gain her composure. 
THE COURT: All right. It's the order of the Cour 
5
 |j that the Defendant shall find findings of fact, conclusion 
of law and decree for the conformity of this record. For th< 
7
 purpose of the record I think that I should make a recor 
8 j that the Plaintiff is very emotional because of this orde: 
9 and has collapsed In the Courtroom. 
10 The Court makes specific findings that the Plaintiff ha; 
11 taken these children to Salt Lake while she has had the 
*
2
 jj under Court order, that they have been living in an apart 
ment, jointly with her sister who is a divorced woman havin 
a minor child in that apartment, and the Court is of th< 
opinion that the change of the custody since this divorc 
13 
14 
15 
16
 || action was had has not been in compliance with the norma 
17
 || standard of living and standards these parties had befor 
18
 this action was filed. 
19
 '' The Court makes a specific finding that the Plaintiff ha: 
20
 || become involved with another man and that was a factor in th 
21
 Court's decision. 
22
 I The Court makes a specific finding that the Plaintiff1: 
23
 || lifestyle has changed and that her concern is basically n 
longer for the family unit, but for the purpose of accom 
25
 || plishing her own desires, 
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t J! New gentlemen, I want to rrake any findings that ycu feel 
2 II you would like rr;e to make for the purpose of the record, and 
1 
*> i 
3
 Mr. Mower, if you have something you'd like me to find, you 
4
 state it now, please. 
5 MR. MOWER: I think it would be important for the 
6 Court to schedule a transfer based on the Court's order. 
7
 There's going to be need for a change on the custody. 
8 THE COURT: Has school terminated? 
9 MR. CHAMBERLAIN: On the 14th, it terminated in Salt 
10 |[ Lake, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Transfer will be made on July 1st. I 
12 believe I better make these rights of reasonable visitation. 
13 I ifin going to make specific visitation, she shall be able to 
14
 I take the children every other Friday until Sunday night when 
15 | they shall be returned by 7:00 o'clock. So she can take them 
16 by Friday at 6:00 p.m., return them by 7:00 p.m. Sunday. But 
17
 || the children shall attend church of their choice so that they 
shall be in church in view of the lifestyle of these parties. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Your Honor, just one question on 
20
 the date of change. The Court awarded her visitation 
21 contimiing with the 4th of July and Ifm wondering about the 
22 | effect that might have on the children to change and I just 
23 | raise that for discussion. 
24 THE COURT: Well, maybe we better make it on the 
25
 | following holiday. 
I PAGE 10 
18 
19 
MR. MOWER: The 24th. 
THE COURT: All right. Theyr11 have visitation on 
the 24th. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Instead of the 4th? 
THE COURT: Instead of the 4th. Now, is there 
anything else, Mr. Mower? 
MR. MOWER: I don't have anything further. 
THE COURT: I'd like to, if you can think of 
anything I missed, I want to make a complete record. 
MR. MOWER: Nothing else I can think of. 
THE COURT: Mr. Chamberlain? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: No. I think not, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate your courtesy, 
gentlemen. I'm sorry it's been so traumatic, but I can't 
help that. This Court will be in recess. Thank you. 
If you111 prepare your findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and submit them to opposing Counsel at least five days 
before you send them to me, I!ll assume that they're correct 
when I get them. So make your findings. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I will submit them and ask him to 
sign them because of the time. 
MR. MOWER: I appreciate that. 
THE COURT: Thank you. This Court will be in 
recess. 
[WHEREUPON Proceedings were completed in the matter 
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